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ABSTRACT 
RELATIONAL MEMORY EXPRESSION FOLLOWING SUBLIMINAL 
PRESENTATIONS OF RETRIEVAL CUES 
 
by 
Allison E. Nickel 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014 
Under the Supervision of Professor Hannula 
 
Several investigations have provided compelling evidence for subliminal perception 
(Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995; Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004a, b; Pertzov, 
Zohary, & Avidan, 2009; Haase & Fisk, 2011). Although, questions about whether or not 
visual information can be processed in the absence of awareness have fostered substantial 
debate (Marcel, 1983; Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Reingold & Merikle, 1988; Merikle, 
1992; Klinger & Greenwald, 1995; Erdelyi, 2003; Holender & Duscherer, 2005). We 
were interested in whether or not processing of a subliminal cue might trigger implicit 
memory for previously studied relationships, and whether or not evidence for successful 
retrieval (following presentation of subliminal cues) could be documented in eye 
movement behavior. Previous work has shown that the influences of memory on eye 
movement behavior are evident early in viewing, found consistently even when viewing 
is counterproductive to the task requirements, and that eye movement measures are 
sensitive to memory for elements of prior experience even in the absence of conscious 
awareness (Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, & Cohen, 2007; Ryan, Hannula, & Cohen, 2007; 
Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hannula, Baym, Warren, Cohen, 2012). By using 
subliminal memory cues, we were able to investigate whether or not eye movements are 
sensitive to memory for studied relationships when participants do not “see”, and are 
therefore unaware of, the retrieval cues. While some of the predicted outcomes were not 
confirmed, two key results suggest that implicit processing of the scene cue influenced 
the expression of subsequent eye-movement-based relational memory effects. First, more 
viewing was directed to faces that were studied with the subliminal scene cues but not 
selected relative to other non-selected faces during an implicit task. Second, the 
emergence of disproportionate viewing to the correctly identified scene associate was 
later than predicted for the control group during a subsequent explicit task. Results from 
the post-test confirmed that subliminal scenes were in fact masked from awareness for 
the experimental group, which was critical to our interpretation of the implicit task data. 
Our results add to previous findings by suggesting that the effects of memory on eye 
movement behavior may occur in the absence of awareness of the retrieval cue. 
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Questions about whether or not visual information can be processed in the 
absence of awareness have fostered substantial debate (Marcel, 1983; Cheesman & 
Merikle, 1984; Reingold & Merikle, 1988; Merikle, 1992; Klinger & Greenwald, 1995; 
Erdelyi, 2003; Holender & Duscherer, 2005), but several investigations have provided 
compelling evidence for subliminal perception (Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995; 
Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004a, b; Pertzov, Zohary, & Avidan, 2009; Haase & 
Fisk, 2011).  For example, Pertzov, Zohary, and Avidan (2009) used eye movement 
measures to investigate the ways in which viewing patterns are influenced by the implicit 
perception of objects.  Each trial in this set of experiments began with the presentation of 
an object that was masked from view.  Thereafter, a change detection display was 
presented.  Two scenes, identical with the exception of a critical object that was modified 
from one version to the next (e.g., a TV remote was rotated 180 degrees across scenes) 
were presented alternately, and participants were instructed to identify the change as 
quickly as possible. Critically, the subliminal object was either the target (i.e., the object 
that changed from one scene to the next) or a distractor that was also present in the scene.  
Results from two experiments indicated that less time was required to detect the change 
and that gaze was attracted more quickly to the location of the change when scenes were 
preceded by a subliminal presentation of the target (vs. the distractor).  This suggests that 
implicit perception of an object can occur and yields faster and more accurate 
performance in a change detection task.  Here, we were interested in whether or not 
processing of a subliminal cue might trigger implicit memory for previously studied 
relationships, and whether or not evidence for successful retrieval (following presentation 
of subliminal cues) could be documented in eye movement behavior. 
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As outlined in more detail below, previous work has shown that the influences of 
memory on eye movement behavior are evident early in viewing, are found consistently 
even when viewing is counterproductive to the task requirements, and that eye movement 
measures are sensitive to memory for elements of prior experience even in the absence of 
conscious awareness (Hayhoe, Bensinger, & Ballard, 1998; Hollingworth, Williams, & 
Henderson, 2001; Hollingworth, Richard, & Luck, 2008; Hollingworth & Henderson, 
2002; Henderson & Hollingworth, 2003; Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, & Cohen, 2007; Ryan, 
Hannula, & Cohen, 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hannula, Baym, Warren, Cohen, 
2012). However, this last finding has not always been replicated (See Smith, Hopkins, & 
Squire, 2006; Smith & Squire, 2008), and therefore does not necessarily provide iron clad 
evidence in support of the view that eye-movement-based memory effects can be 
documented without concomitant awareness of retrieved content.  By using subliminal 
memory cues, we were able to investigate whether or not eye movements are sensitive to 
memory for studied relationships when participants do not “see”, and are therefore 
unaware of, the retrieval cues. 
Cognitive Processing: Insights from Eye Movement Behavior 
The distribution of eye movements across the visual field is not random. Instead, 
eye movements are guided by salient stimulus characteristics and physical properties of 
the elements that are in view (Buswell, 1935; Mackworth & Morandi, 1967).  For 
example, Buswell (1935) investigated the ways in which people look at visual stimuli by 
monitoring participants’ eye movements as they viewed a series of pictures.  While he 
was unable to quantify specific differences in eye movements between participants, he 
did conclude that observers exhibited two forms of eye movement behavior. Viewing 
sequences were characterized by either a general survey of the image, where a succession 
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of brief pauses was distributed over the main features of the photograph, or by long 
fixations over smaller sub-regions of the image. In general, people made quick, global 
fixations early, switching to longer fixations (and shorter saccades) as viewing time 
increased.  When fixation patterns were superimposed on the image, areas with a higher 
density of fixations often corresponded with perceptually salient regions (e.g., eyes in the 
context of a face). These results support the idea that eye movements are not random, and 
are influenced by the stimulus characteristics and physical features of the image being 
viewed. Likewise, Mackworth and Morandi (1967) analyzed eye movement patterns and 
verbal reports to two different pictures presented one after the other for 10 seconds to 
determine the general characteristics of the important regions of the images. Results 
indicated that a few areas within either picture received more fixations of longer duration.  
These areas were assessed subjectively by the participants and judged to be very 
recognizable.  In other words, the participants viewed areas of the pictures that they felt 
were highly informative and would be highly recognizable during another viewing 
occasion.  The remaining areas received few fixations. Visual fixation patterns and verbal 
reports indicated that informative perceptual characteristics (e.g. texture, unpredictable 
contours, unusual details) of pictures were the most likely to be fixated.  The above 
research suggests that eye movements are influenced by perceptual characteristics (e.g. 
colors, textures, contours) that draw attention and provide information about the scene. 
Influences of Semantic Memory on Viewing Patterns 
 The ways in which we evaluate and extract information from a visual stimulus are 
also influenced by semantic memory, or memory for facts, concept knowledge and 
general world knowledge (Tulving, 1972).  When basic perceptual properties of a visual 
stimulus have been controlled, it is possible to identify effects of semantic memory on 
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eye movement behavior.  For example, Yarbus (1967) investigated patterns of eye 
movements evoked by a scene entitled “An Unexpected Visitor”.  Under free-viewing 
conditions, it was found that the more prominent elements (i.e. faces and objects as 
compared to a uniform background or repetitive mosaic) that provide information were 
viewed disproportionately.  When participants were asked to answer certain questions 
about the scene (e.g. How long has the unexpected visitor been gone?) viewing patterns 
changed, reflecting knowledge the viewer had about where in the scene the information 
necessary to answer the question might be located.  The results of this study indicate that 
semantic knowledge can drive eye movement behavior such that regions that contain the 
most useful information are likely to receive more fixations. 
Past work has also shown that general world knowledge about the context and 
location in which an object is expected to be can decrease the time it takes for the eyes to 
detect a target object (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Henderson, Weeks, & Hollingworth, 
1999; Henderson, 2003; Brockmole & Henderson, 2008; Hollingworth, 2009).  In one 
study, Loftus and Mackworth (1978) presented participants with scenes that contained 
either informative or non-informative objects.  An informative object was defined as an 
object that has a low a priori probability of being in that scene (e.g. an octopus in a 
barnyard).  A non-informative object was one that had a high a priori probability of being 
part of the scene (e.g. a tractor in a barnyard).  Results indicated that informative objects 
were fixated faster and more often than non-informative objects. It was proposed that the 
extra time spent fixating the informative object represents the time it takes to incorporate 
that object into an existing schema (i.e., the framework representing some aspect of the 
world). The individuals in this study looked more at objects that conflicted with 
expectations, perhaps because of semantic memory for, or prior experience with, a certain 
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situation.  In another example, Brockmole and Henderson (2008) examined the influence 
of scene-object semantic consistency on viewing patterns.  Participants were split into 
consistent or inconsistent groups where a target object was either semantically consistent 
or inconsistent with the context of the scene and either present for the entirety of viewing 
or added during a saccade.  Results indicated that viewing was directed to the 
inconsistent object sooner than the consistent object for both the “always present” and 
“saccade” conditions.  The results of these studies suggest that the semantic relationships 
of objects to scene contexts are considered when visual information is presented and that 
eye movements can be used to index general world knowledge.   
Eye Movement Behavior Distinguishes Studied from Novel Items 
 The research described thus far has focused on the influence of semantic 
knowledge on viewing behavior.  In contrast, the research described next used pre-
experimentally unfamiliar materials to address questions about whether or not patterns of 
viewing are sensitive to episodic memory for studied materials (e.g., objects, scenes).  
Further, the following studies attempted to determine what the constraints of these effects 
might be (e.g., whether they are influenced by instructional manipulations, or explicit 
recognition accuracy).  Sensitivity of eye movements to memory for faces was examined 
by Althoff & Cohen, 1999.  In several experiments, they found that fewer fixations were 
made to pre-experimentally familiar faces (i.e., famous individuals) and there was less 
constraint on the location of successive fixations to these faces than to novel, non-famous 
faces.  Further, when pre-experimentally unfamiliar faces were presented repeatedly, the 
number of fixations decreased systematically as a function of the number of exposures to 
that face (Althoff, Cohen, McConkie et al., 1998; Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Heisz & Shore, 
2008).  This repetition effect occurred regardless of whether the participants were 
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completing a recognition (Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Heisz & Shore, 2008), emotional 
labeling (Althoff & Cohen, 1999) or recall task (Heisz & Shore, 2008), and was therefore 
independent of task demands. 
Researchers have also used a face recognition paradigm to examine whether 
memory exerts an effect on scanning behavior by analyzing fixation-by-fixation viewing 
patterns to familiar and novel faces.  In the context of this paradigm, participants were 
asked to commit several faces to memory during a study phase and were tested with 
three-face displays.  Using this paradigm, Ryan, Hannula, and Cohen (2007) explored the 
influence of various levels of exposure on eye movements directed to pre-experimentally 
familiar and novel faces that were presented in a three-face test display, and addressed 
questions about whether or not effects of memory on scanning behavior are obligatory by 
manipulating the task instructions.  Eye-movement-based memory effects were seen in 
several experiments.  Specifically, viewing was directed disproportionately to familiar 
faces (i.e., faces seen for the first time during an encoding phase and famous faces) when 
participants were given recognition instructions.  Further, viewing was directed to famous 
faces, even when participants were explicitly instructed not to look at familiar faces.   
In another set of studies, Hannula and colleagues (2012) investigated whether 
manipulations of visual similarity between faces and highly similar morphs of those faces 
would influence explicit recognition of studied faces or lead to incorrect endorsement of 
novel faces as studied.  The researchers were also interested in whether or not eye 
movements distinguish studied faces from the faces incorrectly endorsed as studied.  The 
test phase consisted of three-face displays that were target present, which contained a 
studied face and two faces that were visually similar to that face, or target-absent, which 
contained three faces that were visually similar to a studied face (i.e., the studied face was 
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not presented). Participants were instructed to select a face on every trial (the studied face 
was to be selected if present) and they were subsequently asked to indicate whether or not 
the face they had selected was in fact studied.  Eye movements were sensitive to past 
experience, and distinguished actually studied faces from selected faces that were not 
studied, even when those faces were incorrectly endorsed as have been seen during the 
encoding phase.  So, even when behavioral responses were incorrect, eye movements 
provided a veridical index of past experience.  In sum, the experiments described briefly 
above indicate that eye movement measures are sensitive to memory for studied items 
irrespective of instructional manipulations, and even when explicit recognition responses 
do not accurately reflect past experience. 
Eye Movements are Sensitive to Memory for Inter-item and Item-Context Relationships 
While the work described above was designed to address questions about whether 
or not eye movement behavior is sensitive to memory for individual items, other studies 
have investigated questions about memory for inter-item and item-context relationships.  
Some of these experiments assessed memory for spatial relationships among items 
embedded in the context of a scene (Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow, & Cohen, 2000; Ryan & 
Cohen, 2004a, b; Beck, Peterson, & Angelone, 2007), while others examined memory for 
arbitrarily paired items (e.g., scenes and faces; Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula & 
Ranganath, 2009; Chua, Hannula, & Ranganath, 2012).  Research conducted by Ryan 
and colleagues (2000) used eye movements to explore memory for spatial relations 
between objects embedded in a scene. Following a study phase where several scenic 
images were encoded, participants were presented with novel, repeated, and manipulated 
scenes.  Manipulated scenes were seen during the study phase, but now one of the objects 
embedded in the picture was either a new addition, had been deleted, or was moved from 
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one location to another (e.g., the soap was moved from the right to the left of the sink in a 
kitchen picture). For trials where scenes were manipulated rather than repeated, regions 
where an object used to be or where an object moved to were found to receive more 
fixations. Most importantly, greater viewing was directed to “now empty” regions where 
objects were previously located in manipulated scenes compared to the same regions of 
repeated scenes when they were always empty.  This is notable because eye movements 
tend to be attracted to objects and not empty regions; increased viewing of regions that 
became empty seems to imply memory for what used to be in that location. 
Studies have also examined relational memory for pre-experimentally unfamiliar, 
randomly paired scenes and faces (Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; 
Chua et al., 2012).  In one example, Hannula and colleagues (2007) used a version of the 
face recognition paradigm described above and eye movement measures to examine the 
time course of participants’ access to, and use of, memory for scene-face pairs in several 
experiments using different instructional manipulations. In the study phase, participants 
were presented with several scene-face pairs.  Participants were tested with 3-face 
displays that were superimposed on previously studied scenes.  Test trials were one of 
two types.  “Match” displays consisted of three studied faces, one of which had been 
studied with the scene in the study phase.  “Re-pair” displays consisted of three studied 
faces, but none of them were paired with the scene in the study phase.  Participants were 
instructed to select the matching face when they felt it was present and to simply select 
one of the faces when they felt the associate was not present.  Results indicated that a 
disproportionate amount of time was spent viewing the face that had been studied with 
the scene even in the presence of two equally familiar faces.  This experiment differs 
from those reporting a novelty preference in that the three faces in each test display had 
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been studied equally often, thus preventing differential viewing patterns from emerging 
based on differences in item memory.  Instead, the differential viewing emerged as a 
result of memory for relations between items.  In a second experiment participants were 
instructed to encode the relationships between all three faces and the background context 
in an effort to examine the eye movement patterns to these displays indirectly.  It was 
shown that eye-movement-based relational memory effects were evident even when there 
were no explicit instructions to identify the face that had been studied with the scene.  
Further these effects were not tied to a particular spatial location, as the matching faces 
appeared unpredictably in all three of the possible locations across trials (see also 
Hannula & Ranganath, 2009).  The results suggest that memory for specific face-scene 
pairs shaped the subsequent viewing of the test displays such that differential viewing 
occurred for the matching face and indicate that these eye-movement-based memory 
effects do not depend upon explicit instructions to recognize studied associates. The 
results of these studies speak to the sensitivity of eye movement measures to a variety of 
cognitive content and support the idea that memory for different aspects of experience, 
such as relationships between objects, can influence eye movement behavior.  
Implicit Memory: Eye Movements as a Measure of Memory Without Awareness 
It has been proposed that eye movements may reflect memory prior to conscious 
awareness or explicit recognition (cf. Hannula, Althoff, Warren et al., 2010).  Parker 
(1978) was the first to note that the effects of memory on eye movements develop early 
in viewing.  Specifically, the manipulated region of a studied scene was fixated more 
quickly following picture presentation than the same region when the picture remained 
unchanged.  On average, viewing was directed to the changed region of the scene more 
than one fixation before any viewing was directed to the same region when the picture 
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was not changed.  Other individuals found that these rapid eye movements to 
remembered content are accompanied by an increase in fixation duration (Ryan & Cohen, 
2004a, b; Ryan et al., 2007; Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hannula 
et al., 2012) suggesting that eye movements help gather information that can inform later 
behavioral responses.  Providing further support for the notion that early disproportionate 
viewing can occur prior to conscious awareness or explicit recognition, recent research 
indicates that participants look at fragmented target objects embedded in distractor 
displays several fixations before explicit identification.  For example, Holm et al. (2008) 
had participants complete a fragmented object recognition task where they were asked to 
identify fragmented line drawings of animals embedded in a distractor display containing 
lines that served as distractors.  Participants looked at the regions occupied by fragmented 
target objects as many as 25 fixations before explicit object recognition.  Methodical and 
virtually exclusive investigation of the target region was apparent four fixations prior to 
explicit identification. 
In other research, time-course and response-locked measures have been developed 
to determine when in time eye-movement-based memory effects emerge relative to 
stimulus onset and associated behavioral responses (Hannula et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 
2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hannula et al., 2012).  Effects of relational memory 
on eye movement behavior have been documented 500-750 ms after onset of the test 
display and as much as 1-1.5 seconds before explicit recognition responses were made in 
the face recognition and face-scene experiments conducted by Hannula and colleagues 
(Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hannula et al., 2012).  The time-
course of these effects was resistant to changes in the task instructions, becoming 
apparent 500-750 ms following stimulus presentation whether participants were told to 
11 
 
identify the familiar or matching face or instructed to avoid viewing of this face when 
presented within a 3-face test display (Hannula et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2007; Hannula & 
Ranganath, 2009; Hannula et al., 2012).  Taken together, the results provide strong 
support for the automatic influence of memory on eye movement behavior, and suggest 
that these effects may precede and contribute to explicit recognition (Hannula & 
Ranganath, 2009; Hannula et al., 2012; see also Moscovitch, 2008). Further, the results of 
these experiments suggest that eye movements can be used as a temporally accurate 
measure of memory expression and, since they are able to reflect memory prior to 
conscious awareness, they may also reflect memory in the absence of conscious 
awareness and explicit recognition.  
 Evidence consistent with the proposal that eye movements are sensitive to 
memory despite an absence of explicit recognition has been reported in a handful of 
experiments. As indicated briefly above, participants look disproportionately at regions of 
scenes that have been systematically manipulated (Ryan et al., 2000; Ryan & Cohen, 
2004a, b; Beck et al., 2007).  Critically, the same effects have been found even when 
participants fail to report the changes explicitly or fail to recognize that anything has 
changed (Hayhoe et al., 1998; Hollingworth et al., 2001, 2008; Hollingworth & 
Henderson, 2002; Henderson & Hollingworth, 2003; Ryan & Cohen, 2004a; Ryan et al., 
2007). Hollingworth and colleagues (2001) examined the influence of swapping an object 
with a different exemplar from the same category (e.g., a plate is swapped with a 
different plate on a table) on eye movement behavior.  Participants spent more time 
viewing a target object that was replaced with a different exemplar, even when they 
failed to detect the change explicitly. Hayhoe (1998) also reported the sensitivity of eye 
movements to changes in visual materials in the context of a block-copying task.  Here, 
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the participants copied a pattern of colored blocks and the consequences of changing the 
color of the blocks during active eye movement were examined.  Participants showed 
disproportionate viewing to the changed blocks, even when they were unable to reliably 
report the changes verbally.  The results suggest that eye movement measures may be 
more sensitive indicators of memory representations than explicit recognition, providing 
further support for the use of eye movement measures to study memory.  Taken together, 
the results described above suggest that eye-movement-based memory effects can be 
expressed even when explicit recognition has failed or is incorrect. 
 The influences of different types of memory have been revealed through eye 
movement behaviors using a variety of materials and instructional manipulations.  This 
has allowed researchers to ask specific questions about distinct memory systems. 
Disproportionate viewing of items and relations that were studied previously may 
precede and contribute to the development of awareness, as suggested by Hannula et al. 
(2007).  In other words, conscious awareness may occur as a result of changes in our eye 
movements, rather than eye movements resulting from conscious awareness. Based on 
results like those described briefly above, it has been proposed that eye-movement-based 
memory effects occur automatically, shortly after stimulus presentation, and may be 
evident long before, or even without, conscious awareness of successfully recovered 
content. However, it is possible that some of these effects reflect the tendency for 
participants to adopt a conservative response criterion – that is, they may not report a 
change, despite a suspicion that one has occurred. Furthermore, some studies have failed 
to document influences of memory on eye movement behavior in the absence of 
awareness, and have instead linked these effects to high confidence recognition responses 
(e.g., Smith, Hopkins, & Squire, 2006; Smith and Squire, 2008).  Here, we were 
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interested in investigating whether or not successful relational memory retrieval can be 
documented in eye movement behavior even when retrieval cues are presented 
subliminally.  The combined use of subliminal masking procedures and eye movement 
methods to investigate relational memory was novel, and this approach was intended to 
help resolve current debates about whether or not memory can be documented in eye 
movement behavior in the absence of awareness. 
Subliminal Stimulus Presentation:  Evidence of Memory for Information Masked from 
Awareness  
Recent studies conducted by Henke and colleagues (Henke, Mondadori, Treyer, et 
al., 2003a; Henke, Treyer, Turi Nagy et al. 2003b; Degonda, Mondadori, Bosshardt, et 
al., 2005; Duss, Oggier, Reber, & Henke, 2011; Reber & Henke, 2011; Reber & Henke, 
2012; Reber, Henke, & Duss, 2013) have examined whether or not evidence for memory 
can be documented without conscious awareness (implicit memory) using subliminal 
stimulus masking procedures, but none of these investigations have used eye movement 
measures.  In one of these experiments, used here to describe the general approach, 
Henke and colleagues (2003a) used subliminal stimulus masking techniques to present 
combinations of faces and written professions to an experimental group or just faces to a 
control group so that participants were unaware of them. Here, faces and written 
professions were presented very quickly between two pattern masks repeatedly such that 
the stimuli were presented six times in 3 seconds for encoding.  During a subsequent 
retrieval phase, the faces were presented for conscious inspection, and participants were 
asked to guess the category of the associated profession.  Accuracy for the retrieval phase 
was not significantly different from chance for either the experimental or control groups.  
However, reaction times for the correctly guessed professional categories were 
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significantly shorter than incorrectly guessed categories for participants in the 
experimental group; the same results were not evident in the response times of control 
participants (see also Duss et al., 2011).  These results suggest that associations between 
the faces and professions were successfully encoded despite the fact that they were not 
accessible to awareness.  However, without significant differences in accuracy between 
groups, the results are rather equivocal.  We hoped to shed light on this matter by 
including eye movement measures in our analyses, which had the possibility of showing 
group differences in viewing patterns in conjunction with reaction time differences and in 
spite of the lack of difference in accuracy.  
Current Investigation 
The following study was designed to address questions about whether or not 
processing of a subliminal cue might trigger implicit memory for previously studied 
relationships, and whether or not evidence for successful retrieval (following presentation 
of subliminal cues) can be documented in eye movement behavior.  Participants studied 
several (visible) scene-face pairs and were asked to commit these pairs to memory.  
During a corresponding test phase, each trial began with the presentation of a studied 
scene cue that was presented subliminally (i.e., masked from awareness).  Following the 
subliminal scene cue, a 3-face display was presented; for half of the participants, one of 
the faces was the studied associate of the scene cue.  Participants were instructed to select 
the face they thought was the associate of a visible scene to be presented after the 3-face 
display, and were told that this task was a measure of foresight; eye movements were 
recorded.  This implicit test of memory permits examination of eye-movement-based and 
behavioral measures of memory.  Subsequent to the implicit test, the same 3-face display 
was presented again, but now it was preceded by the visible scene.  In this case, the 
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associated face was present regardless of group assignment.  Participants were instructed 
to select the face that had been paired with the scene in the encoding phase and eye 
movements were recorded.  This explicit test of memory also permits examination of eye-
movement-based and behavioral measures of memory. 
As reported by Hannula and colleagues (Ryan & Cohen, 2004a, b; Hannula et al., 
2007; Ryan et al., 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hannula et al., 2012), we expected 
that eye movements would be sensitive to memory for the face that was associated with a 
specific scene context, but here these viewing effects were expected even when scene 
cues, meant to trigger memory for studied relationships, were presented subliminally.  
Consistent with results reported by Henke and colleagues (Henke et al., 2003a, b; 
Degonda et al., 2005; Duss et al., 2011), it was predicted that participants assigned to the 
experimental group would respond more quickly when associates were identified 
correctly (vs. not) following subliminal scene cues. This outcome would provide 
additional evidence for memory in spite of the absence of awareness of the retrieval cue.  
Before providing a detailed description of the methods used to conduct the primary 
experiment, a norming study that was designed to assess the effectiveness of the 
subliminal masking procedure will be described. 
METHODS: NORMING EXPERIMENT 
It was critical, in the context of the current investigation, that scene cues were 
successfully masked from awareness.  Therefore, a method was developed to 
systematically degrade each scene, and a norming experiment was performed to eliminate 
visible scene exemplars from the set that would be carried forward for use in the study. 
During the norming task, scenes were presented in a masking sequence, which was 
followed by a 2-alternative forced-choice test.  Participants attempted to identify the 
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masked scene, guessing if necessary, and were then asked to describe any perceptual 
information they had noticed when the masking sequence was in view.  This procedure 
was meant to increase the likelihood that scene cues would not be perceived explicitly in 
the investigation, and is described in more detail below; detailed methods for the primary 
investigation are provided in a subsequent section. 
Participants 
Sixty-seven undergraduate students participated in the norming experiment and 
were compensated with course credit.  Informed consent was obtained from each 
participant prior to initiating the 
experiment in a manner approved by the 
Institutional Review Board at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 
Materials  
One-hundred sixty-eight pictures 
were chosen from a database or found 
online (see Hannula & Ranganath, 
2009).  Half of these pictures were 
indoor scenes (e.g, dentist office) and 
the remainders were outdoor scenes 
(e.g, Millennium Park).  For norming 
purposes, each scene was degraded 
systematically using Adobe Photoshop 
in a process that yielded a set of nine 
Figure 1.       Scene Degradation Method: A gray layer 
was superimposed over each scene.  The opacity was 
adjusted by 10% and the scene was saved to create 10 
exemplars for each scene (0-90%). 
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additional exemplars of each original scene.  To produce each set, a gray layer (R: 115, 
B: 113, G: 113) was superimposed on top of the original scene.  The opacity of this gray 
layer was then repeatedly reduced by 10% so that the picture underneath was made 
increasingly visible (e.g., picture + gray scale layer at 90% opacity, picture + gray scale 
layer at 80% opacity). Following each reduction in the opacity of the gray overlay, the 
resulting image was flattened and saved (See Figure 1).   
Forty-two black and white visual noise images were used as masks during 
subliminal scene presentation; these masks have been described elsewhere (e.g., Henke et 
al., 2003a).  Scenes and masks were presented at 600 x 450 pixel resolution, in the center 
of the screen.  Scenes presented were presented at 225 x 300 pixel resolution for the 
forced-choice task. 
Design and Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants were seated at a distance 
approximately 25” from the computer screen and task instructions were provided.  A 
practice block was also administered to ensure that the participants understood the 
instructions.  Participants who volunteered for this experiment were told that a series of 
visual noise images would be presented very rapidly on the computer screen in front of 
them.  Because the goal here was to identify and eliminate scenes that were visible when 
subliminal masking sequences were presented, participants were also told that a scenic 
picture would be embedded among the visual noise images, and that they would be asked 
to identify that picture at the end of each trial.  To eliminate potential differences in the 
distribution of attention across trials and participants, a visual attention task was 
performed as the masking sequence was presented.  Successful performance on this task 
required that participants direct their attention to a fixation cross in the center of the 
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computer screen.  They were told that the fixation cross would either be replaced with a 
horizontally oriented line segment or a vertically oriented line segment at some point 
during the trial and that they should press a button as soon as they noticed the change. 
Finally, following the subliminal masking sequence, a two alternative forced-choice test 
was presented and participants were asked to identify the scene that had been presented in 
the subliminal sequence by making a button press.  Following their response, participants 
were asked if they had seen the picture or any component thereof (e.g., shapes, shadows, 
contours, or flashes that were not consistent with the masking pattern). Responses were 
recorded by the experimenter and provided a subjective measure of scene perception. 
The masking 
technique developed 
by Henke et al. 
(2003a) was used to 
present scenes 
subliminally on each 
trial. The scenes were 
flanked by visual noise 
masks and presented 
twelve times in 6 seconds.  Presentation durations were 17 msec for scenes (S), 183 msec 
for masks (M), and 233 msec for fixation crosses/bars (F).  The presentation of one scene 
was given in the following sequence F-M-S-M-M-S-M-F-M-S-M-M-S-M-F-M-S-M-M-
S-M-F-M-S-M-M-S-M-F-M-S-M-M-S-M-F-M-S-M-M-S-M (see Figure 2).  As 
described above, the fixation cross was replaced randomly with a horizontal or vertical 
Figure 2.        Example norming trial: The masking sequence and forced-
choice presentation. 
19 
 
bar once per trial. Following the subliminal presentation of the scene, a two-alternative 
forced-choice display was presented for 5 seconds (see Figure 2). 
Scenes were randomly assigned to one of 12 blocks, each consisting of 14 trials. 
Each scene was used once as a target and once as a foil on the 2-alterntive forced-choice 
test, and the targets and foils appeared equally often on the left and the right across trials. 
The initial round of testing (N=20) was done with the original grayscale scenes.  
Subsequent testing (N=47), conducted only for the subset of scenes that were reliably 
detected on the 2-alternative forced-choice test, was performed with increasingly 
degraded versions of those pictures (e.g., the original image + gray layer at 10% opacity) 
and was repeated until an appropriate level of masking was identified for each scene.  
The highest level of degradation required for sufficient masking of a given scene was 
70%.  More than half of the scenes (N=96) were found to be successfully masked from 
awareness without degradation. 
RESULTS: NORMING 
 The number of times a scene was successfully identified was calculated for each 
scene to be used in the main experiment and a global mean was calculated across scenes.  
On average scenes were successfully identified 53.3% of the time (SD=11.4%) and 
performance was reliably greater than chance (t(161) = 3.67, p < 0.0001).  Binomial tests, 
performed for each picture individually indicated that performance was not better than 
chance for 120 scenes.  Performance was reliably below chance for 9 of scenes and above 
chance for the remainders (i.e., for 39scenes).  Because participants did not report any 
subjective awareness of scene features, even in cases of above chance performance on the 
objective 2-alternative forced-choice task, it was determined that scenes had been masked 
from awareness. 
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METHODS: PRIMARY EXPERIMENT 
The primary experiment was designed to investigate whether or not subliminal 
scene cues can support successful relational memory retrieval. Participants encoded 
several scene-face pairs, and were tested with 3-face displays.  On a given test trial, the 3-
face display was presented twice.  The first presentation was preceded by a subliminal 
(i.e., masked) scene cue, and the second presentation was preceded by a visible scene 
cue.  The first exposure permitted us to examine implicit memory for studied scene-face 
relationships, and the second exposure permitted us to examine explicit memory for the 
same pairs.  Evidence for memory was examined using eye movements and behavioral 
responses. 
Participants 
Forty undergraduate students were recruited to participate in this experiment and 
were compensated with course credit.  Each participant was randomly assigned to either 
the control group (N=20) or to the experimental group (N=20).  Informed consent was 
obtained from each participant prior to initiating the experiment in a manner approved by 
the Institutional Review Board at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. One 
participant assigned to the experimental group was dropped from reported analyses 
because explicit recognition performance was more than two standard deviations below 
the group mean, and was at chance (33.33% correct). 
Materials 
One hundred sixty-eight gray-scale scenes were selected based on the outcome of 
the norming experiment described above.  In addition, one hundred sixty-eight gray-scale 
faces (half female; half male) were selected from an established faces database (see 
Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009).    
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Forty-two black and white visual noise images were used as masks during the 
subliminal scene presentation (e.g., Henke, Mondadori, Treyer et al., 2003).  Scenes and 
masks were presented at 600 x 450 pixel resolution, in the center of the screen. Faces 
were presented at 210 x 210 pixel resolution, and superimposed on top of a 225 x 225 
pixel gray background. 
Apparatus 
Eye position was recorded every 17 msec (i.e., 60 Hz) with an Applied Science 
Laboratories D6 remote eye tracker (Applied Science Laboratories, Bedford, MA).  This 
eye tracking system operates by illuminating the eye with infrared light and recording 
changes in the angle between the pupil and the corneal reflection as the eyes move.  
Movement of the head in all three dimensions was recorded using a head tracking system 
and head position was integrated with eye position to permit reliable acquisition of data 
that reflects gaze coordinates.   
Design and Procedure 
After providing their informed consent, participants were seated at a distance 
approximately 25 inches from the computer screen and task instructions were provided.  
Following a brief practice session, participants had an opportunity to ask any remaining 
questions. The experiment began after eye position was calibrated using a 3 x 3 spatial 
array, a process that was repeated prior to each experimental block. Individual trials were 
only initiated when participants were fixating a centrally located black circle.   
Participants were presented with 3 interleaved encoding and test blocks.  Novel 
scenes and faces were used for each of the corresponding encoding and test block pairs.  
Upon completion of the experiment, participants were debriefed about the true nature of 
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the masking sequence and completed a short post-test questionnaire.  Then, they 
completed an objective awareness test in 3 blocks.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prior to the first encoding phase, participants were instructed that they should 
commit 56 scene-face pairs to memory. Scenes were presented for 2 seconds, and were 
followed by a 5 second presentation of the same scene with a face superimposed on top 
(see Figure 3).  Following the presentation of the pair, participants indicated whether or 
not they thought there was a good fit between the person and the place depicted in the 
scene by making a button press (e.g. How well does the scene fit the face? 1 = Terrible 
Fit, 2 = Poor Fit, 3 = Good Fit, 4 = Excellent Fit); a time limit was not applied to this 
judgment, which was meant to encourage deep encoding of each pair. 
Each trial in the retrieval phase began with the subliminal presentation of a 
studied scene followed by a visible 3-face display for implicit retrieval of the face-scene 
associations.  Next, a visible scene was presented followed by a 3-face display 
Figure 3.       Example encoding trials:  2s scene presentation, 5s scene and face presentation 
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superimposed on the same scene for explicit retrieval of the face-scene associations.  
Participants were not told about the presence of the scene in the subliminal sequence; 
instead, they were instructed to perform the attention task described earlier.  Participants 
were told that a fixation cross, presented among visual noise masks, would either be 
replaced with a horizontally oriented line segment or a vertically oriented line segment at 
some point during the noise sequence and that they should press a button as soon as they 
noticed the change.  To conceal the purpose of the scene masking sequence, participants 
were told that the task measured attention alone.  Following the subliminal masking 
sequence, the 3-face test display was presented for 5 seconds for the implicit retrieval of 
previously formed associations.  All three faces in this display were seen during the 
encoding phase. Participants were asked to select the face from this display that they 
expected would be the associate of the upcoming visible scene cue; participants were told 
this is a measure of foresight, and this cover story permitted us to obtain behavioral 
responses for 3-face displays that were preceded by subliminal scene cues (i.e., a 
behavioral measure of implicit memory). 
Following the first 3-face display, a visible scene was presented for 2 seconds, 
followed by the same 3-face test display, now superimposed on top of the scene, which 
remained in view for 5 seconds.  Participants were instructed to indicate which face had 
been paired with this scene during the encoding phase (i.e., a behavioral measure of 
explicit memory).  Finally, participants were asked to indicate how confident they were 
in the accuracy of their explicit recognition response (1=high confidence, 2=low 
confidence, 3=guess).  
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As indicated above, participants were randomly assigned to either the 
experimental group or the control group prior to testing.  For participants in the 
experimental group, the subliminal scene was the studied associate of one of the faces in 
the 3-face display (see Figure 4a).  Participants assigned to the control group were 
presented with the same 3-face displays but none of the faces had been studied with the 
subliminal scene cue (see Figure 4b).  For participants in both groups, the visible scene 
cue was the studied associate of one of the faces in the 3-face display (see Figure 4a and 
b).  All of the faces used in the 3-face displays, for both groups, were studied in the 
encoding phase.  The experimental group was presented with 14 scenes (both 
Figure 4.       Example test trials: A: Experimental group, B: complementary control group sequence. 
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subliminally and supraliminally) and the control group was presented with 28 scenes (14 
subliminally; 14 supraliminally) in each test block.  The critical face (i.e. the matching 
face for the experimental group, and the same face absent the match for the control 
group) appeared equally often in each spatial location (i.e., left, right, or bottom) across 
trials.  Altogether, participants completed 42 test trials in this experiment. 
Following the final retrieval block, a 2-part post-test designed to assess awareness 
was administered.  Up to this point, the participants were not informed about the 
subliminal stimulus presentations or the purpose of the experiment. During the first part 
of the post-test, participants were asked several questions about the masking sequence. 
Responses to these questions provided a subjective measure of scene perception and 
recognition. The participants were then told that subliminal scene cues were presented in 
the visual noise prior to the first 3-face display and several more questions were asked 
(see Appendix).  During the second part of the post-test, a more objective test of 
awareness was administered.  The testing procedure described above (see norming 
experiment) was used to obtain scene visibility estimates for each participant.  
Participants were told that a masking sequence, identical to the ones used previously, 
would be presented, but now they had been informed that a scene would be present in 
each sequence.  With this in mind, they were asked to identify that scene when a 2-
alternative force-choice display was presented immediately after the masking sequence 
ended. The awareness test was broken up into three blocks of 14 trials (42 trials in total) 
as in the retrieval phase. Scenes from pairs that were encoded, but were not used as cues 
during the test phase, were used for the post-test.  Use of encoded scenes was important 
because it is possible that scenes embedded among visual noise masks are more easily 
identified when they have been studied.  Scenes that were used in the awareness test were 
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presented in reverse order relative to when they had been encoded (scenes encoded more 
recently were presented first, those encoded more remotely were presented last). This 
approach meant that we could examine whether or not any successful detection of 
subliminally presented scenes was affected by the amount of time that had passed since 
encoding. Targets and foils appeared equally often in all spatial locations (i.e. left, right) 
across trials.   
Counterbalancing 
For counterbalancing purposes, each of the individual scenes were randomly 
assigned to one of 12 lists (14 scenes per list), each with equal numbers of indoor and 
outdoor scenes.  Faces were also assigned to one of 12 lists (14 faces per list), each with 
an equal number of male and female faces.  For each participant, a given list of scenes 
was then paired with a given list of faces.  Individual scenes and faces from 
corresponding lists were presented as pairs during the encoding phase. One-quarter of the 
scenes and three quarters of the faces were used to construct the retrieval trials for the 
experimental group. Half of the scenes and three quarters of the faces were used to 
construct the retrieval trials for the control group.  The remaining half of the scenes, those 
that were not used in the retrieval trials for either group, was used to construct the post-
test awareness trials.  Counterbalancing ensured that across participants each list of faces 
was presented equally often with each list of scenes across blocks and experimental 
conditions.  
Eye Movement Analyses 
Evidence of retrieval and use of memory for face-scene relationships was taken 
from time course measures, which provide information about how viewing unfolds over 
the course of a test trial. One of the faces in each 3-face display was designated a critical 
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face, and viewing time directed to that face was evaluated.  For participants assigned to 
the experimental group, the critical face was the studied associate of the subliminally 
presented scene cue (implicit test trials) and was also the studied associate of the visible 
scene cue (explicit test trials).  Control group participants saw the same 3-face displays, 
but here, the critical face was not the studied associate of the subliminal scene cue 
(implicit test trials); the associate was not present in the 3-face display. Following visible 
scene cues, the studied associate was present, and was the critical face (explicit test 
trials).  
Previous studies have shown that overall viewing measures (i.e., proportion of 
viewing time) collapsed across an entire trial do not always reveal effects of memory (cf. 
Hannula et al. 2007).  Time-course measures will permit us to determine whether and 
when disproportionate viewing of the critical face occurred, after 3-face displays were 
presented.  Starting with the onset of the 3-face displays, eye movement data was binned 
into consecutive 250ms time bins and the proportion of total viewing time directed to the 
critical faces was evaluated.   
Statistical Contrasts 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed with corrections using the 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment to reported p-values when there was more than 1 degree 
of freedom in the numerator. This correction was applied because the Greenhouse-
Geisser epsilon values deviated substantially from 1.0 for several of the ANOVAs that 
were calculated. Because this can indicate violations of sphericity, the more conservative 
p-values are reported. All of the reported post-hoc comparisons were Bonferroni 
corrected. 
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RESULTS 
Behavioral Performance: Accuracy and Response Times 
Attention Task  
Compliance with attention task instructions was generally good – participants 
failed to make responses on just 5.19% (SD=12.24) of the trials. For the remaining trials, 
successful detection/identification of horizontal or vertical line segments embedded in the 
subliminal masking sequence was well-matched across groups (experimental group: 
82.61% correct, sd=16.60; control group: 82.09% correct, sd=22.32; t(37)=.08, p>.05). 
Implicit Memory for Scene-Face Relationships  
Consistent with previous work (Henke et al., 2003; Duss et al., 2011), participants 
were not expected to show better than chance performance on the test of subliminal 
memory for studied scene-face relationships. In other words, participants assigned to the 
experimental group were not expected to select the critical face more often than the 
remaining two faces in the 3-face display despite the fact that the subliminal scene cue 
had been paired with that face during the study phase.  In addition, selection of the 
critical face was expected to be well-matched across groups.  However, group differences 
were expected when response times were evaluated.  Specifically, the experimental group 
was expected to respond more quickly when the critical face was selected versus not; no 
differences in response time were expected for the control group.  
Following the presentation of subliminal scene cues, participants failed to make 
responses on 3.11% (SD=5.81) of the trials when 3-face displays were presented. 
Reported results are based on the subset of remaining trials in which participants did 
respond.  
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To test the first hypothesis, the percentage of selected critical faces was calculated 
for the experimental group and for the control group. As predicted, the critical face was 
selected equally often by both groups (experimental group: mean= 34.77%, sd=5.99; 
control group: mean=34.80%, sd= 7.35; t(37) = 0.01, p > 0.05), and neither group 
selected critical faces more often than would be expected by chance (experimental group: 
t(18)=1.29, p>0.05; control group: t(19)=1.09, p>0.05).   
To determine whether or not there were reaction time differences between groups 
associated with selection of the critical face, a between-groups repeated-measures 
ANOVA was calculated with the factors group (experimental vs. control) and trial type 
(critical face selected vs. critical face not selected).  In contrast to the predicted outcome, 
the experimental group did not make faster responses than controls when the critical face 
was selected (non-significant group x selection interaction (F(1,37) = 0.59, p>0.05). 
Instead, response times were well-matched across groups and trial types, the numerical 
difference was not statistically reliable (F’s(1,37) ≤ 2.65, p’s>.05; see Table 1). 
Therefore, results reported by Henke and colleagues (Henke et al., 2003; Duss et al., 
2011) were not replicated in this experiment. 
 
TABLE 1: Response time means and standard deviations (in parentheses) on the implicit test of memory. 
 
 Critical Face Selected Critical Face Not Selected 
Experimental Group 2466.03 (731.77) 2490.88 (810.75) 
Control Group 2838.81 (618.82) 2799.86 (468.84) 
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Explicit Memory for Scene-Face Relationships   
For the explicit task, the visible scene cue was the associate of one of the faces in 
the 3-face display for participants assigned to both groups. Here, participants were 
instructed to identify that face from among the three alternatives and it was predicted that 
there would be no difference between groups in accuracy or reaction time.  
Participants failed to make responses on 3.72 % (sd =6.25) of the explicit task 
trials. The results reported below are based on the subset of remaining trials in which 
participants did respond. 
To test the predictions outlined above, the percentage of correctly identified 
associates for both groups was calculated. As predicted, the associate was correctly 
identified equally often by participants assigned to the experimental (mean= 75.92%, 
sd=16.14) and control groups (mean=83.11% , sd= 10.57; t(37) = 1.65, p > 0.05), and 
recognition performance was well above chance levels for both groups (experimental 
group: t(18) = 11.59, p < 0.05; control group: t(19) = 21.2, p < 0.05). 
To examine reaction time differences, a repeated-measures ANOVA with factors 
group (Experimental vs. Control) and accuracy (associate correctly identified vs. 
associate not identified) was computed. Results indicated that response times were well 
matched across groups (F (1,30) = 0.79, p >.05), but were significantly faster when the 
face that had been paired with the visible scene cue was successfully identified (F (1,30) 
= 117.271 , p >.05).  The group by accuracy interaction was not statistically reliable 
(F(1,30) = 0.516, p > 0.05; response times are reported in Table 2). 
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TABLE 2: Response time means and standard deviations (in parentheses) on the explicit test of memory. 
 
 Critical Face Selected Critical Face Not Selected 
Experimental Group   2114.00 (484.43) 2900.26 (686.19) 
Control Group 2232.04 (405.64) 3109.19 (500.26) 
 
Subsequent Memory Analyses 
To account for the possibility that participants may not have successfully encoded 
some of the studied pairs, implicit behavioral data were back-sorted as a function of 
response accuracy on the explicit recognition test.  Here, data analysis was limited to the 
subset of implicit trials for which participants successfully identified the associate when 
the corresponding explicit test was administered. We expected that implicit effects might 
be evident when explicit memory for studied scene-face relationships was accurate. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with the factors group (Experimental vs. Control) and trial 
type (critical face selected, critical face not selected) was calculated for the subset of 
implicit trials that were associated with correct explicit responses. Even when the pairs 
had been successfully encoded and explicitly retrieved, there was no evidence for the 
predicted response time differences in the implicit data. The slight numerical difference 
in responses times were not statistically reliable – there was not a main effect of group or 
trial type, nor was there a statistically significant interaction (F’s(1,36) ≤ 2.27, p’s>0.05; 
see Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
TABLE 3: Response time means and standard deviations (in parentheses) on the back-sorted implicit test 
data 
 
 Critical Face Selected Critical Face Not Selected 
Experimental Group 2440.37 (679.20) 2488.90 (801.07) 
Control Group 2812.90 (604.22) 2760.10 (481.19) 
 
Eye Movements 
Implicit Memory for Scene-Face Relationships   
Past work has shown that participants spend more time viewing materials (e.g., 
face, objects) that are selected and studied than materials that are selected, but were not 
studied – an eye-movement-based memory effect (Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula & 
Ranganath, 2009; Hannula et al., 2012). Here, for participants assigned to the 
experimental group, one of the faces in the 3-face display (i.e., the critical face) was the 
studied associate of the scene cue. Based on previous findings, it was predicted that 
experimental group participants might spend more time viewing selected critical faces 
than other faces that happened to be selected, but were not studied associates of the 
subliminal scene cue. This outcome, if it was documented, would reflect implicit memory 
for scene-face relationships.  The same effect was not expected for control participants 
because the critical face had not been presented with the subliminal scene cue during 
encoding (thus, selected critical faces were no different from other selected faces).  
It has also been shown that when participants fail to identify studied items, eye 
movements may be drawn to those items disproportionately relative to other non-selected 
(and non-studied) items in the same display (Hannula & Ranganath, 2009). This suggests 
that even when experimental group participants fail to select the critical face, they may 
spend more time viewing it than the other non-selected face in the same display.  Again, 
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control group participants would not be expected to show this memory-based viewing 
effect because the subliminal scene cue was not the associate of the critical face.  
Time-course measures were used to evaluate these predictions. For the analyses 
that follow, data from the first 2 seconds following 3-face display onsets were 
considered. Analyses were limited to early viewing because this is the time frame in 
which other relational memory effects have been documented previously (Hannula et al., 
2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; Hannula et al., 2010; Ryan et al., 2007).  Broadly 
speaking, individual trials were separated into two categories – trials on which the critical 
face was selected, and trials on which the critical face was not selected. From these two 
trial types, there were four faces of interest: 1) selected critical faces; 2) critical faces that 
were not selected; 3) faces that were selected in error; 4) non-selected faces. Note that the 
last three face types all come from the same display (from trials on which participants did 
not select the critical face).  
A between-groups repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors group 
(experimental, control), face type (critical face selected, critical face not selected, selected 
face, non-selected face) and time bin (0-250, 250-500, etc.) was calculated. Proportion of 
viewing was well matched across groups (F(1,37) = .273, p > 0.05) and no interactions 
between group and time bin (F(6,222) = 0.80, >0.05) or group and face type (F(3,111) = 
.47, p > 0.05) were found.  There were significant differences in the proportion of 
viewing based on face type (F(3,111) = 72.453, p < 0.05) because more time was spent 
viewing faces that were selected. There was also an effect of time bin (F(6,222) = 4.571, 
p < 0.05) such that viewing changed across the duration of the trial. A significant 
interaction between face type and time bin was found (F(18,666) = 3.07, p < 0.05) 
suggesting an effect of selection on eye movement behaviors across time.  The most 
34 
 
important finding was an interaction between face type, time bin, and group (F(18,666) = 
3.289, p < 0.05). This result suggests the presence of eye-movement-based memory 
effects for previously studied face-scene pairs.  To determine what was driving this 
interaction, post-hoc comparisons were calculated.  
Post-hoc comparisons were performed to examine whether or not disproportionate 
viewing occurs for the selected critical faces relative to the selected faces and also 
whether disproportionate viewing is directed to the non-selected critical faces relative to 
non-selected faces. Disproportionate viewing was directed to the selected face relative to 
the selected critical face between 250-500ms for the experimental group (t(36) = 3.37, p 
<0.05). Further, disproportionate viewing was directed to the non-selected critical faces 
relative to non-selected faces between 1500-2000 ms (ts(36) ≥ 2.85, p < 0.05; see Figure 
5.).  This is an important finding, as it reflects memory for the face-scene pairing despite 
the subliminal presentation of the scene cue.  Therefore, it provides evidence of implicit 
memory for studied scene-face relationships. When the same comparisons were made for 
the control participants, no differences in viewing directed to the selected critical face 
relative to selected faces (ts(38) ≤ 1.10, ps > 0.05) or the non-selected critical face 
relative to the non-selected faces (ts(38) ≤ 2.31, ps > 0.05) were found. 
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Figure 5.  Time course for implicit task by group. 
 
Explicit Memory for Scene-Face Relationships 
For the explicit task, the visible scene cue matched (was the associate of) the 
critical face in the 3-face display for participants assigned to both groups. On the explicit 
test, participants were instructed to identify the critical face from among the three 
alternatives. In this case, trials were one of two types and there were two faces of interest: 
1) correct trials: correctly identified associates; 2) incorrect trials: faces selected in error. 
Disproportionate viewing of the correctly identified associates relative to faces 
selected in error was expected for participants assigned to both groups, an effect that 
would reflect memory for scene-face relationships. 
As described above, and consistent with past work, disproportionate viewing of 
the correctly identified associate was expected to be evident early in the trial (i.e., 
between 500-750ms) for the both groups.  A between-groups repeated-measures ANOVA 
with the factors group (Experimental vs. Control), face type (correctly identified 
associate, faces selected in error), and time bin (0-250, 250-500, etc.) was calculated. 
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Proportions of viewing were matched between groups (F(1,36) = 0.19, p > 0.05).  
Significant differences were found in the time course data as a function of face type 
(F(1,36) = 39.465, p <0.05) such that correctly identified associates were viewed 
disproportionately relative to faces selected in error.  No other significant main effects or 
interactions were found (Fs < 1.52, ps > 0.05).  
Planned comparisons indicated that there was significantly more viewing directed 
to the correctly identified associates as compared to faces selected in error for the 
experimental group starting at 500-750 ms (t(36) = 3.23, ps <0.05). The same 
comparisons made for the control group indicated that disproportionate viewing to 
correctly identified associates emerged later in time (750-1000 ms time bin: t(37) = 4.04, 
p < 0.05; See Figure 6). This is notable because we would expect that participants in both 
groups would have very similar viewing patterns as they are completing the same task.   
 
 
Figure 6.  Time course for explicit task by group. 
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Post-Test: Assessment of Awareness 
Attention Task 
Similar to the retrieval phase, successful detection/identification of horizontal or 
vertical line segments embedded in the subliminal masking sequence was well-matched 
across groups (experimental group: 83.30% correct, sd=20.01; control group: 89.58% 
correct, sd=11.77, t(37)=1.02, p>.05). In addition, compliance with attention task 
instructions was generally good – participants failed to make responses on just 4.40% (sd 
= 6.26) of the trials. This was important because it ensured that the participants had 
generally complied with instructions to orient attention to the center of the screen during 
subliminal scene presentation. 
Subjective Awareness 
As was the case in the norming experiment, participants were not expected to 
indicate that they were aware of the subliminal presentation of the scene when the post-
test questionnaire was administered, and in fact, very few participants suspected the 
presence of subliminal stimulus presentation (four from the experimental group; five 
from the control group). These participants reported that they thought they saw flashes or 
glimpses of something occasionally, but did not guess that scenes were embedded in the 
visual noise sequence.  After being told about the presence of the scenes, none of the 
participants who reported some awareness of the subliminally presented stimuli were able 
to reliably report scene content, size, or screen location. 
Objective Awareness   
Subjective measures of awareness indicated that participants were not aware of 
the presence of the scene, but to confirm that this was indeed the case a more objective 
test was conducted. It was expected that participants would not perform better than 
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chance when they were asked to explicitly identify a subliminally presented scene on 2-
alternative forced-choice test trials.   
Collapsed across groups, participants failed to make a response on 0.55 % 
(SD=1.39) of the forced-choice post-test trials. Reported results are based on the subset 
of remaining trials in which participants did respond.   
Identification of subliminally presented scenes was not better than chance for the 
experimental group (mean= 51.80, SD=6.84; t(18) = 1.15, p > 0.05), but was reliably 
greater than chance for the control group (mean=57.33, SD=9.89; t(19) = 3.313, p < 
0.05). The absence of above-chance performance among experimental group participants 
is critical, and suggests that the disproportionate viewing directed to critical faces that 
were not selected on the implicit test is unlikely to have been a consequence of conscious 
awareness of the masked scene cue. 
Post-test accuracy by block 
Scenes in the awareness phase blocks were presented in reverse order (scenes 
encoded more recently were presented first, those encoded more remotely were presented 
last) from the encoding phase blocks to permit us to examine whether or not awareness of 
subliminally presented scenes was affected by the amount of time that had passed since 
encoding. To test whether or not this was the case, average accuracy for each block (Post-
test block 1: encoded most recently; Post-test block 2; Post-test block 3: encoded most 
remotely) for each participant was calculated.  A repeated-measures ANOVA with 
factors group (Experimental vs. Control) and block (Post-test block 1, 2, 3) was 
calculated.  As might be expected based on the patterns of post-test performance 
described above, there was a marginal between-groups difference, such that the control 
participants were more successful at identifying the subliminal scene on average (F(1,37) 
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= 4.132, p = 0.049).  However, performance was not influenced by how recently scenes 
were encoded, and there was not a group by block interaction (F’s(2,74) ≤ 0.295, p’s> 
0.05).  These results are informative, and suggest that pictures that were seen more 
recently are not better detected than pictures that were seen early in the experiment. 
DISCUSSION 
 The current experiment was designed to address questions about whether or not 
the successful retrieval of relational memory could be expressed and documented in the 
absence of awareness. The combined use of subliminal masking procedures and eye 
movement measures to investigate relational memory was novel and represents a 
substantial departure from past work. While some of the predicted outcomes were not 
confirmed, two key results suggest that implicit processing of the scene cue influenced 
the expression of subsequent eye-movement-based relational memory effects. First, more 
viewing was directed to faces that were studied with the subliminal scene cues but not 
selected relative to other non-selected faces during the implicit task. Second, the 
emergence of disproportionate viewing to the correctly identified scene associate was 
later than predicted for the control group during the explicit task. Results from the post-
test confirmed that subliminal scenes were in fact masked from awareness for the 
experimental group, which was critical to our interpretation of the implicit task data. 
These results will be subject to further discussion in the paragraphs that follow. 
Before turning to the key findings mentioned briefly above, some of the predicted 
outcomes that were not confirmed will be described. As outlined in the introduction, past 
studies (Henke et al., 2003; Duss et al., 2011), have indicated that responses are made 
more quickly when participants correctly guess professions that were presented 
subliminally with faces than when they guessed incorrectly. The same results were not 
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evident in the response times of control participants.  The results from these studies 
suggest that associations were successfully encoded despite the fact that they were not 
accessible to awareness. In line with these studies, it was predicted here that there would 
be differences in reaction times for implicit task trials where the face that had been paired 
with the subliminal scene cue was selected relative to trials where other faces were 
selected. Evaluation of reaction time data did not confirm this prediction. Specifically, 
response times were not faster when participants assigned to the experimental group 
happened to select the associate of the subliminal scene cue.  Although slightly 
numerically different, response times were well matched across groups and trial types. 
Therefore, the reaction time differences reported by Henke and colleagues (Henke et al., 
2003; Duss et al., 2011) were not replicated in this experiment. However, these analyses 
have not always been performed in studies investigating implicit associative or relational 
memory (e.g., Degonda et al., 2005; Reber & Henke, 2011; Henke et al., 2003). 
Consequently, it is possible that the effect is subject to specific testing conditions, which 
makes it difficult to replicate. Future experiments will need to investigate when and under 
what circumstances these response time differences occur.   
While the behavioral evidence for relational memory in the absence of awareness 
was not evident here, several documented effects have been found in the patterns of eye 
movements directed to stimuli in the absence of awareness, and so it was possible that 
eye movements would be sensitive to memory in the current investigation. For example, 
previous work has shown that the influences of memory on eye movement behavior are 
evident early in viewing, are found consistently even when viewing is counterproductive 
to the task requirements, and that eye movement measures are sensitive to memory for 
elements of prior experience even in the absence of conscious awareness (Hayhoe et al., 
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1998; Hollingworth et al., 2001, 2008 Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; Henderson & 
Hollingworth, 2003; Hannula et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 
2009; Hannula, et al. 2012). Further, similar effects of memory on eye movements have 
been documented even when participants are not explicitly instructed to identify the 
associate or when they make incorrect behavioral responses (e.g, Hannula et al., 2012; 
Hayhoe et al., 1998; Hollingworth et al., 2001, 2008; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; 
Henderson & Hollingworth, 2003; Ryan & Cohen, 2004a; Ryan et al., 2007). For 
example, past work has shown that participants look disproportionately at the region of a 
scene that used to contain an object, even when they fail to explicitly report subsequent 
manipulations. 
 While previous work has demonstrated that prior knowledge maintained in 
memory may influence what areas within a display are fixated and for how long even 
when participants are unable to reliably report a change (Ryan et al., 2000; Ryan & 
Cohen, 2004a,b), it may have been the case that participants were aware and just not 
confident enough to report their awareness subjectively (Hannula & Greene, 2012; 
Hannula, Simons, & Cohen, 2005).  Further, the results of these studies have not been 
replicated consistently in the absence of awareness (e.g., Smith, Hopkins, & Squire, 
2006; Smith and Squire, 2008) and therefore do not provide concrete evidence for 
relational memory in the absence of awareness. The current work addressed these issues 
by combining subliminal stimulus presentation with eye movement measures of memory.  
Most importantly, subjective and objective post-tests were conducted to ensure that the 
reported results weren’t an effect of low level awareness or awareness of the subliminal 
scenes that participants were not confident to report.  
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Based on past work, which has demonstrated the sensitivity of eye movements to 
relational memory for previously studied scene-face pairs (Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula 
& Ranganath, 2009), we had predicted for the implicit task that participants assigned to 
the experimental group would look disproportionately at selected faces following 
subliminal scene cues when that face happened to be the associate. While there was not 
any evidence for disproportionate viewing directed to selected scene associates, 
evaluation of the eye movement data did reveal that participants in the experimental 
group spent more time viewing faces that had been associated with scene cues, but were 
not selected, as compared to other non-selected faces.  This effect was statistically 
reliable between 1500 and 2000ms after the onset of the 3-face display that followed the 
subliminal scene cue. Disproportionate viewing to the non-selected critical face reflects  
relational memory for the face-scene pair because the associate is no more familiar than 
the other faces and was not located in a particular spatial location. Relational memory 
effects, evident within 1500-2000 ms of display onset have also been documented in past 
work. In that experiment, face-scene pairs were encoding at study and at study the 3-face 
display was presented simultaneously with the scene (i.e., no scene preview; Hannula et 
al., 2007).  Disproportionate viewing to the face that was associated with the scene 
emerged around 1500-1750 ms and was delayed relative to experiments where 
participants received a scene cue. It may be the case, in the current experiment, that in the 
absence of a visible scene cue, effects of selection dominate early viewing, and memory 
effects emerge subsequently following the selection process (i.e., without the visible cue, 
effects of memory emerge more slowly). When the same comparisons were made for the 
control participants, no differences in viewing directed to the non-selected critical face 
relative to the other non-selected faces were found. This outcome makes sense as critical 
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face had not been the studied associate of the subliminal scene cue for this group. 
Together, these qualitatively different outcomes suggest that the difference seen for the 
experimental group likely reflects implicit relational memory for the face-scene pairing. 
Skeptics might argue that disproportionate viewing effects outlined above for the 
implicit task were a consequence of residual awareness of the scene cue. However, 
subjective and objective measures of awareness indicate that this was not the case. 
Results from the post-test questionnaire indicated that very few participants suspected the 
presence of subliminal stimulus presentation.  When suspicions were raised, participants 
did not guess that scenes were embedded in the visual noise sequence. Even after being 
told about the presence of the scene, none of the participants who reported some 
awareness of the subliminally presented stimuli were able to reliably report scene 
content, size, or location on the screen. Because subjective measures are subject to 
reporting biases, and may reflect uncertainty or low confidence rather than a lack of 
awareness (Hannula & Greene, 2012; Hannula, Simons, & Cohen, 2005), an objective 
test of awareness was administered as well. Critically, results indicated that identification 
of subliminally presented scenes was not better than chance for the experimental group. 
This suggests that disproportionate viewing directed to the non-selected critical face for 
the implicit task was not a consequence of residual conscious processing of the masked 
scene cue.  
 Previous work has demonstrated the sensitivity of eye movements to relational 
memory for previously studied pairs (Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009). 
Therefore, it was predicted for the explicit task that trials where the associates were 
correctly identified would have more viewing directed to selected scene associates for 
both groups. As predicted, results from eye movement analyses for the explicit task 
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indicated that there was disproportionate viewing directed to the face that had been 
studied with the scene and selected, relative to faces selected in error for both groups.  
However, the time course was different between the groups. Participants in the 
experimental group directed significantly more viewing to the correctly identified 
associate as compared to faces selected in error beginning at 500-750 ms. This finding 
replicates previous results where eye movements were drawn disproportionately to faces 
at test that matched the scene at study emerging between 500-750 ms following 3-face 
display onset and persisting for the rest of the trial (Hannula et al., 2007). The same 
comparisons made for the control group indicated that disproportionate viewing emerged 
later in time and was initially evident in the 750-1000 ms time bin. This is later than 
predicted and notable because we would expect that participants in both groups would 
have very similar viewing patterns as they are completing the same task, and had the 
same encoding experience. Indeed, the only difference between groups was whether or 
not the subliminal scene cue was the associate of one of the faces in the 3-face displays. 
There are at least two potential explanations for this effect – 1) facilitation: priming 
experienced by the experimental group to view the associate due to the congruent 
subliminal cue prior to the explicit task, or 2) interference: the control group recieved an 
incongruent cue prior to the initial 3-face display which interfered with subsequent 
viewing of the associate during the explicit task. Because results from the experimental 
group were as predicted, it seems unlikely that the difference is due to facilitation in that 
group, but instead is a result of interference experienced by the control group. 
That the effect described above may be a consequence of interference caused by 
the subliminal scene cue is suggested by past work that examined influences of an 
incongruent subliminal prime, presented prior to a comparison task, on subsequent 
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explicit behavioral responses (Naccache & Dehaene, 2001). In this experiment, 
participants were briefly presented masked numbers.  Following the masked presentation 
of the number, participants were presented with visible numbers and asked to make a 
button press indicating whether the visible number was greater than or less than the 
number five.  Critically, the masked number was either congruent with the visible 
number (e.g., both the masked number and the visible number were greater/less than five) 
or incongruent (the masked number was greater than five and the visible number was less 
than five or vice versa).  Results from this study indicated that when the masked number 
and the visible number were incongruent, reaction times were much slower than for 
baseline trials (the masked stimuli was a series of $’s).  The researchers suggested that 
the masked number primed the participants to make one response or another and when 
the visible number was incongruent interference is introduced.  The participants have 
prepared responses based on the subliminal cue and when the visible cue is incongruent, 
it takes time to switch gears to make the correct response. It may be the case in the 
current experiment that the incongruent subliminal scene cue interferes with the 
subsequent expression of eye movement based memory effects following the congruent 
scene cue in the explicit task for the control group. Future work could address questions 
about whether and how conflicting implicit information interferes with subsequent eye 
movement based associative memory effects during an explicit task. 
 In sum, our results add to previous findings by suggesting that the effects of 
memory on eye movement behavior may occur in the absence of awareness of the 
retrieval cue. Subliminal cueing appears to influence eye movement behavior such that 
changes in eye movements occur despite an absence of awareness. The results from this 
study complement past work that suggests that memory can be successfully documented 
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in the absence of awareness (see Hannula & Greene, 2012; Hannula et al., 2010 for 
reviews), and strengthen these claims by addressing potential confounds (e.g., low level 
awareness) that may have contributed to outcomes reported previously.  The reported 
results make contact with and expand upon classic and recent work on picture processing 
and eye movements, which have suggested memory can be documented reliably in the 
absence of awareness.  
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Appendix  
Post-experimental interview 
During the experiment you were shown several pictures that looked like noise on a television set 
and you were asked to perform the alertness test.  Did you notice anything in the noise or 
did you see any regularity in the noise while you were performing the alertness test? 
 
If participant responds ‘yes’ to the above question, then the experimenter will ask and 
record responses to the following questions:  
 
Describe what you saw: 
 
Did you see it clearly? 
 
How big was it? 
 
Where on the screen did you see it? 
 
Did you always see it or just sometimes? 
 
In case you saw it only sporadically, when and how often did you see it? 
 
We have asked whether you saw anything in the noise because when you were performing the 
alertness task, a picture – one of the studied scenes – was being presented very quickly in 
between the displays of black and white dot patterns. The picture was being presented so 
quickly that you were unlikely to have noticed it or to have noticed anything out of the 
ordinary.  Now that we have told you about the presence of the scene, do you feel that 
you may have been aware of this on some of the trials? If so, where exactly do you feel 
the scenes were located and how big do you feel they were? 
 
Questions and information for all participants: 
 
Did you potentially see contours of letters, words, faces, or objects?  
 
Indoor and outdoor scenes were presented very briefly – for 17ms – in the visual noise. Now that 
you know this, do you think that you sometimes had a hunch of a scene?  
 
If yes, where exactly did you see scenes? How large were they?  
 
In fact, we presented the scenes in the middle of the screen. The size of the scene was equivalent 
to the size of the pattern mask. The fixation cross was located at a point that 
corresponded to the center of the scenes. Now that you know this, do you think you could 
see any aspects of scenes? Edges? Curves? Changes in contrast? Objects? 
 
